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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

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NAVAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Aboard Large ASW Ship

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 77 p 1

[Article by Capt 2d Rank L. Buchinskiy from on board the large antisubmarine ship "Admiral Nakhimov" (by radio): "The Depth Charges Find the Target"]

[Text] WO [Michman] A. Fokin, the supervisor of the large ASW ship's sonar team, was waiting for the results of an analysis of the watery depths. The analysis should firm up the data on the hydrology of the sea in the vicinity. Based on experience, the warrant officer knew that nothing comforting could be expected here at this time of year. Nevertheless, hope spring's eternal--very much in today's search will depend on the hydrology which "enemy" submarines, not without reason, consider their ally.

The report arrived rather quickly. The warrant officer thought to himself "You couldn't imagine worse." It had just seemed that he had done everything possible to prepare for the search and now an irresistible desire arose to weigh and check everything again. He, an expert in his military speciality, had more than once satisfied himself that the set was able to "exceed" the target detection range technical characteristics when used intelligently and skilfully. The entire work of sonarmen lies in their attention and very strict discipline during the watch.

Fokin carefully watched the faces of his subordinates within the combat post by the pale light of the screen. PO 2d Class V. Sizov and Sr Smn G. Litvin quietly worked intently. There was no necessity now to remind them of anything. It's a poor commander who begins to instruct subordinates at the last moment.

... Although one operator was performing the watch, everyone looked for the target. Warrant Officer Fokin, listened to the horizon as if he were sifting noises and searched for the main sound--the propellers of a submarine. However, the submariners did not give themselves away. The more these agonizing minutes of searching and of waiting passed, the more chance the submariners had to escape detection.

However, Fokin did not lose confidence that in the end they--the ASW men--would achieve their goal. One must be able to believe in this, not fear the time rushing by, and not permit haste and bustle. The skill and tenacity of sonarmen lie here. The warrant officer taught his subordinates this first of all. He also taught them to work together. Each specialist has his strong points. If everything that is best in the work of individual sonarmen is put together, the post's output coefficient will grow spectacularly. He, himself, is such a knowledgeable specialist that he never ignores the advice and recommendations of his subordinates. Even if they were subsequently rejected, they were good because they bore witness to the interest and initiative of the sailors.

The screen stubbornly reflected only the splashes of surface targets. At first glance, they should not interest the sonarmen. Nevertheless, Warrant Officer Fokin watched them carefully and analyzed the surface situation. He did not do this before. However, Capt 1st Rank R. Saushev, a staff officer and former commander of an ASW ship, boarded their ship during one cruise. He conducted several special classes with the sonarmen and taught them to use the abundant capabilities of the equipment to the maximum. The officer repeated many times: "A sonarman must not only be a registering clerk who listens and sees what is on the screen. He must also know how to think tactically."

WO A. Fokin couldn't help but know that the sonarmen on the ASW ship, which R. Saushev commanded at one time, were considered the best in the large unit. Therefore, the sailors did not simply regard the advice of the captain first class with attention but tried to "find out" from the staff officer everything that interested them. The warrant officer decided to change somewhat the specialists' work style. The sonarmen began in some situations to express their suggestions to the ship's commander. He soon saw the practicality of this.

Now upon the request of the sonarmen, the commander gave permission to change the ship's course. The warrant officer's recommendation was justified: a hardly noticeable white blip splashed on the screen marking the target. The sonarmen's data confirmed the analysis of the combat information center and of the main command center. The instructions received from the GKP [main command center] to report the bearing and range of the target convinced Fokin that his intuition had not let him down--it was a submarine.

Suddenly, the screen was filled with interference. Evidently, the submariners sensed they had been detected. But it was too late. Aviators now helped to maintain contact with the target.

WO A. Fokin was relieved from watch but he did not leave the combat post although he had decided that he would not interfere in the work of his subordinates with even a single word. The ship now had to solve a new complicated task: to move to another quadrant of the sea, find an "enemy" submarine and inflict a depth charge strike.

On the eve of carrying out this task the sonarmen and the specialists in the torpedo department had called for a competition between each other. Warrant Officer Fokin imagined how worried the VCH-3 commander, Lt G. Shkuta, was. He was worried first of all about them--his rival sonarmen. If PO 2d Class V. Sizov and Sr S mn G. Litvin don't establish contact with the submarine, there will simply be nothing for the torpedo men to do. The officer was also worried about himself. It was his first firing as commander of the department. Lieutenant Shkuta had commanded a group before. It was the best on the ship. The commander himself had passed ahead of schedule the examination for permission to control a department on his own.

Reflecting on this, WO A. Fokin involuntarily noted that the competition, which had impelled them to bring their subunits and departments to the ranks of progressive ones, had played a very important role in his professional growth and in the professional growth of Lt G. Shkuta along with the help of senior personnel.

... This time also the sonarmen established contact with the target in time. Despite the "enemy's" tricks, the ASW men held on to it firmly while the torpedomen did their job. The depth charge strike accurately straddled the submarine. This meant that the crew had carried out the assigned task in an excellent manner.

Return Trip Letdown Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 99 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Gridnev, an officer on the fleet's staff: "The Last Miles of the Cruise"]

[Text] He who has had occasion to be present during the reports of ship commanders who have just returned from a long cruise, knows that in the majority of cases the report ends with the confident phrase: "The ship is ready to perform new assignments!"

Of course, unforeseen circumstances can arise on an ocean. Maintaining equipment in an exemplary condition throughout a long cruise requires persistent work, especially during the last stage of the voyage.

The last stage. It essentially consists of the move from the far reaches of the ocean, where the crew's combat training took place, to the home port. It is annoying to a commander when his subordinates, who have acquired solid experience during a cruise, make mistakes, which at first glance are unexplainable, in an uncomplicated situation.

Here is an example. A submarine had been at sea for a long time. The crew had achieved teamwork in their actions. The sailors confidently carried out all tasks and exceeded the norms. The equipment operated smoothly. The boat received the order to return to base and "losses" in teamwork began to occur little by little in various teams. Some specialists yielded to an attitude of complacency (they said, the most difficult part was behind them) and began to be careless on watch.

A crash dive was being carried out as it had been more than once. On command a number of operations had to be carried out by the engineer on watch. Convinced by the warning system that the equipment was working as it should, the engineer reported the boat was ready to submerge. The electrician on duty, also convinced of the correctness of his comrade's actions from the instruments, set the electric motors in motion. This was as it should be.

In actuality, the sailors violated instructions. The engineer on duty, PO 2d Class A. Yefremenko, had not glanced at the warning system although through carelessness he had switched on a different piece of equipment. The electrician on watch put it in operation without looking to see which pieces were functioning.

When the ship's commander subsequently asked PO 2d Class A. Yefremenko how he, an experienced engineer, could make such a stupid mistake which was inexcusable even for a new man, the latter began to justify himself by the fact that the work was, as they say, routine and did not require any special concern. It appeared it was done without mistakes and coped with on the ocean but when holding out one's hand to the base...

A characteristic declaration. The psychological state of the petty officer is known to every sailor who has been on a cruise for months. When the "return point" has been passed and the course leads home, people suddenly notice that they are tired. An unconscious desire to let down and to give themselves a respite arises in some of them. They are lulled by the thought: The main tasks have been solved. Only unimportant matters remain--the last miles....

A false thought! And at the same time rather dangerous both for the equipment and for the men. However, the danger of such an attitude is sometimes recognized in the crew, unfortunately, only when an error has already been committed.

I visited a group of staff officers on the submarine, about which we are talking, not long before the incident described above. A check showed that the crew's training was, without a doubt, high. However, the inclination of some specialists to treat the requirements of instructions, which have been mastered, as prepared writing samples causes one to prick up one's ears. They said we have learned to operate with closed eyes in the ocean and we, manage this in accordance with the norms for a high classification. In summing up the results of the check, the attention of all officers, primarily the ship's commander, his deputy for political affairs, and the engineering officer was directed to these attitudes and to the necessity to increase watchfulness. Unfortunately, not all of these took our advice into consideration. In particular, officer P. Poplevko with whom a detailed discussion had also taken place did not caution his subordinates on the peculiarities of the cruise's last stage. He did not concern himself with the very strict observance of requirements in regulations and instructions. I see in this not only excessive self-confidence and complacency but also the direct disregard by some officers of the recommendations of military psychologists.

A completely different approach to the psychological peculiarities of the last stage of the cruise was shown in the crew which at the time had completed a long ocean cruise. As has been laid down, the vessel's commander set the example of a strict attitude. This was shown in both important and small matters although minor details do not exist on an ocean cruise. The commander was able to extract great benefit even from such an ordinary task as making the rounds of the vessel.

Any commander, when making the rounds of the vessel, checks the condition of the compartments, tries to investigate in detail the functioning of the equipment and, naturally, rubs shoulders with the sailors, petty officers, warrant officers, and officers. However, will each one try to investigate the fine points of the men's attitude as meticulously as the details of maintaining the equipment and operating the machinery and systems? Meanwhile, active contact with the men, an analysis of their statements, and nuances of conduct on watch and while resting permit the commander and his deputies in this case to detect in time the appearance of the first undesirable symptoms in the attitude of individual sailors.

Oneday Capt 3d Rank V. Skopenko, the deputy commander for political affairs, asked a sailor, whom he was accustomed to seeing in the first ranks of competitors, why he had received a three for his performance of duty. Not only the sailor himself but also the watch engineering officer who had given this rating were not able to answer the question intelligibly. The officer, who incorrectly understood what had caused the political worker's concern, said: "If necessary, I can change it to a four."

The vessel's commander did not consider this event a minor one. On the contrary, when he next made the rounds of the boat, he tried to investigate what indoctrinational effect competition has on the men as it actually takes place in subunits and on combat watches. It turned out that the burst of competition, which until now had relied on an understanding of the importance of the tasks being solved by the vessel at sea and the responsibility of each one for the success of the collective, imperceptibly came to nothing here and there during the final stage of the cruise. Competition boiled down to the formal assigning of grades which did not always interest even those whose work was being evaluated.

These facts were discussed by the party and Komsomol bureaus. The exchange of opinions permitted a concrete plan of action to be drawn up. First, the efforts of commanders and activists were directed toward increasing attention, toward raising the indoctrinational, and it is possible to say, the emotional side of competition and toward eradicating shoots of formalism. The same rating for watch performance began to show up for each specialist and combat shift based on objective items. The role of warrant officers, petty officers and Komsomol group organizers in determining the ratings grew.

A ship-wide contest for high operation of the equipment was announced. Technical quiz games whose questions were formulated interestingly and were

well thought out, were included within the limits of the contest. It is especially important at sea to avoid boredom and set patterns in working with the men and to introduce into any measure an element not only of competition but also of emotion.

Other methods of influencing the men's attitude also played a role. When the situation permitted, cheerful and inspiring music was played over the broadcast system using the phonograph equipment. It was carefully selected by the political worker. Tapes of instructions and desires, which Capt 3d Rank V. Skopenko had requested in advance from relatives and close friends of the sailors in various parts of the country, also had a good moral and psychological effect. In particular, once when Smm S. Lukart acted wrongly, not only the strict Komsomol discussion of his comrades but also the living voice of his mother and her instructions to her son helped the sailor to take himself in hand and to understand the inadvisability of such breakdowns.

Of course, a decisive role in maintaining a combat attitude and high watchfulness in the crew until the last mile of the cruise was played by the exactingness of the commander and all officers, by their ability to maintain strict regulation order on the vessel and to organize underway watches accurately, and by following instructions. In a word, a combined approach toward mobilizing the sailors to achieve the highest indices in combat training during all stages of the cruise was provided for here.

The return from a cruise is the prelude for the next cruise. Therefore, the closer one is to one's native shore, the more persistent should one be about observing the excellent naval precept: "I came from the sea ready for a voyage!"

Effect of Grading System

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jun 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank V. Alekseyev, a ship's deputy commander for political affairs: "Criteria for Self-Appraisal"]

[Text] The sailors on our ship, just as all the Soviet people, are now studying the materials of the May (1977) CC CPSU Plenum and the draft of the new constitution for the USSR. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CC CPSU pointed out in his report that discussion of the draft constitution "must arouse new creative forces in the people, attach new scope to competition, and raise the responsibility of each one for the task entrusted to him."

Naturally, we are striving in our daily work to take into consideration the requirements to organize competition, raise its mobilization and indoctrinational role in every possible way, and direct the fighting men's patriotic upsurge toward further increasing watchfulness and combat readiness. Success in this work depends a lot on the officers, on their activity, their principles and their skill.

The first week of the long cruise was coming to an end. The crew was already drawn up in an underway regime. This was well traced on the Socialist competition graph. The green color of the fours convincingly predominated on it. There were less fives and quite a few threes.

In general, it was possible to consider the state of affairs normal. However, something on the graph bothered me. It aroused me to analyze this colored mosaic of grades carefully.

Simple calculations showed that the second shift took first place most frequently. (As is known, the entire crew is divided on a cruise into combat shifts which perform watch in turn and competition is primarily organized between them). The average grade in the second shift was somewhat higher than the others. But the first shift had the best watch officer, a strong party group organizer and a good Komsomol group organizer. All told, there were more experts in combat specialties and first class specialists here. Was it possible they put on airs? It couldn't be. There were individual reproofs but the ship's commander did not have any great claims toward the first shift.

I moved away from the graph in a thoughtful mood. Perhaps the second shift had really been able to mobilize itself immediately and move to the front deservedly. I turned around--sailors were standing near the graph and were engaged in a lively discussion.

One of the sailors said with clear resentment: "Of course, I had not changed my collar by the posting of my first shift. The watch officer immediately wheeled in a three. But you, on the second shift--half of the sailors were late for the posting--tons of fresh water were driven into the bilge--nevertheless all fives.... You will always be in first place this way...."

That, which the sailor had said in an outburst of temper, perhaps did not quite correspond to reality. However, it did cause one to prick up one's ears. It is an undoubted fact that not only commanders but also sailors zealously watch the progress of competition. It was necessary to talk with them. We held a Komsomol meeting.

The second shift caught it. It was strongly criticized. Shortcomings, which at times escaped the command, did not go unnoticed in the collective. The sailors on the second shift agreed with the criticism finally. I had an involved discussion with the watch officer on the second shift.

Sr Lt V. Yegrov was in a very uncomfortable position. The desire to bring his shift to the best, no matter what, dulled his demandingness and led essentially to the opposite result. I tried to explain to the officer that directing competition is not only an organization but also a moral task. Yegorov answered somewhat surprisingly: "They didn't teach me that".

The declaration on the surface was strange. The moral aspect of any matter, especially the men's indoctrination, must always concern an officer. He is

required to master this from the student's bench. However, it was necessary to think about it. Indeed, have we taught and indoctrinated watch officers as leaders of the combat shift's socialist competition? Very serious attention is devoted to the training of watch officers on ships. They are taught navigation, the combat employment of weapons, the use of movement systems, how to control the ship, and many other things. But concerning questions of leading competition, it is often considered that this will come by itself.

Of course, help is provided to a watch officer during it. However, it quickly concerns the external aspect of organizing competition. I myself explained to Senior Lieutenant Yegorov how to assign ratings and how to calculate the average grade and what to consider in doing this This was necessary because competition requires an accurate documentation of the way it is fixed and checked. However, it is necessary to consider that the results themselves and the ratings only acquire a convincing force when they do not contain any trace of subjectivity. Probably the most complicated thing here is to teach and motivate an officer to strive for objectivity, fairness and principle in all cases of evaluating his work and that of his subordinates.

It was necessary to admit that we had not attached the required importance to these questions even before we departed on the cruise. More could have been done from the beginning of the cruise--for example, a careful analysis of the first successes of the shifts and not hurrying to conclusions. Then we would have been able to correct the errors of the young watch officer immediately and not hold him up as an example and thereby encourage unwittingly an incorrectly formulated policy.

Nevertheless, the reflections on the graph were not very belated. The state of affairs soon straightened itself out. Order was introduced into the determination of ratings both for individual sailors and for combat shifts. The activity of the party and Komsomol group organizers was increased. The analysis and publicizing of the experience of first rate sailors in the competition on tasks and norms were improved. This objective evaluation of the sailors had an effect on the entire progress of the competition. Its effectiveness noticeably increased.

We introduced into the practices of working with watch officers such methods as instructional classes and an exchange of experience in leading competition. Attention was paid during one seminar to an imperfection in the so-called "point" system of summing up results and the passion for formal statistics.

For example, it happened that the shift in which serious derelictions in performing bridge watches were committed, received more points than the others. During one watch Sr Smn N. Ponomarev in formally measuring the temperature of the bearings, did not pay attention to the fact that the temperature was absolutely identical at a number of measuring points. Had Ponomarev treated his work more seriously, he would have understood that he was using a faulty instrument.

The watch officer acted severely and justly. He gave the senior seaman an unsatisfactory rating. The shift lost 20 points. However, during secondary work this shift soon made up what had been lost and again went out in front. However, everyone understood the true price for such superiority.

During a meeting of the watch officers and party and Komsomol group organizers we drew up new, more objective and accurate criteria for evaluating competition results. Capt 3d Rank A. Kochetkov, a communist, conducted a demonstration of how to sum up results in his combat shift. The young watch officers were able to learn a lot and to compare their approach to evaluating the successes of the shift with the approach of an experienced, mature officer well known for his principles and objectivity.

In general, the watch officers completed a fine school for thoroughly leading their shifts during the cruise. Now Senior Lieutenant Yegorov was not able to say that he had not been taught to direct competition. However, the main thing is that he did not require such a justification. The young watch officer achieved real successes with his combat shift under the control and with the help of his senior comrades. He valued them as real, deserved and affording true pleasure.

The cruise became a good school for everyone, including myself. I realized the importance of a healthy moral climate in socialist competition and that it was necessary to establish it skilfully.

ASW Crew Training Procedures

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Poshivaylov, a fleet staff officer: "The Combat Nucleus of a Ship"]

[Text] The ships were searching for an "enemy" submarine. The search area was wide and the sea's hydrology favored the submariners. Therefore, the flagship did not receive any reports on detecting the target for a long time. Finally, such a report arrived from Capt 3d Rank G. Alant'yev, commander of an ASW ship.

Considering the complexity of the situation, the flagship gave orders to check the reliability of the contact carefully. After some time, the ship's commander confidently answered: "There is a contact."

Additional forces were sent to the area where the "enemy" had been detected. However, the flagship soon concluded that Captain 3d Rank Alant'yev had mistaken interference for the submarine. Decisive measures were required in order to find and attack the "enemy" submarine within the designated time.

How could such an incident happen? During the critique of the exercise, when the course of events on board the ASW ship were being analyzed by the headquarters and flagship, it became clear that the reason for the mistake was

rooted in the work style of the ship's ASW team (KPR). Some specialists on it relied more on intuition than on accurate calculations and acted negligently.

The watch sonarman considered a single target sign--a blip on the set's screen--as sufficient basis to classify an object as a submarine.

The chief of the radio technical service, Engr- Capt Lt N. Telushkin did not use the capabilities of the sonar set to classify the target correctly. The navigator, Capt Lt L. Seregin, who was required to analyze the nature of the observed object's movement did not attach any significance to the fact that the target "super zealously" repeated the ship's maneuvering in course and speed. The peculiarities of the bottom's relief in the area of the search was also not taken into consideration.

The ship's commander did not direct and check on the work of the ship's ASW team in the required way. He entrusted this to his senior assistant--an officer recently appointed to the position and possessing insufficient control experience.

The ship's ASW team is called the combat nucleus of a ship. Its training and teamwork have a direct effect on the quality of searching for a submarine and on the effectiveness with which ASW weapons are used. The KPR obtains, analyzes and depicts information on the enemy and the situation. Here, in accordance with the commander's tactical concept, decisions are prepared and their explanation is organized and controlled. In brief, the most important combat tasks are solved in this group.

Therefore, increased demands are placed on all team members especially the officers. KPR specialists are called upon to improve their knowledge tirelessly, to train regularly, polishing their skills, and to practice teamwork from day to day.

These requirements can be shown to be ordinary truths. Nevertheless, they are followed in this crew not as strictly as the interests of the affair require.

The crew, of course, settled on success. However, work at sea was cheapened by the mistakes of a small group of specialists. As it turned out, when training the team they did not devote special attention on the ship to the effectiveness of each class and the quality of each specialist's training. Indeed, what effectiveness can you talk about since part of the specialists were absent during a number of classes ! The sonarmen, on whom depend the timely detection of a target and the reliability of the contact with it, were trained "at their own discretion"--they did not have a clear assignment for each class. Combat information center (BIP) specialists were in a peculiar situation. They were called upon to collect, depict and analyze information on the sea situation. Individual sailors had a vague knowledge of their specific duties. This in no way contributed to the accuracy of their commands and reports.

However, to place this at the door of the petty officers and sailors would hardly be justified: They did not have an opportunity to master the sequence of reports because an accurate schedule of duties for each combat information center specialist had not been determined on the ship.

As is known, there are standard ship rules in which the general tasks of the combat information post are formulated. However, experience shows that a mastery of this document does not guarantee each member's accurate knowledge of his duties in specific combat situations. It is not listed in it.

That is why these rules are called standard. They serve as a basis for determining the specific tasks of the combat information center on a specific ship. Experience in the effective use of weapons and equipment is being accumulated during training and competition. New tactical principles are being developed. Innovations are being introduced. Control and information processing principles, which have stood up, are being adjusted in conformity with actual circumstances. The duty of flagship specialists and ship officers is to summarize progressive experience and periodically revise and make more precise the documents regulating the duties of combat teams.

Unfortunately, this was not done on the ASW ship. Once, I suggested a sonarman tell about the signs for classifying a contact with an underwater target using the booklet "Combat Team Member." The sailor told about it. However, there and then he made a slip in speaking: he says he acts in a different way in practice since only standard signs are written in the booklet. The sonar station at which the sailor works has a notorious difference and requires that individual signs be especially taken into consideration.

Therefore, for the sake of a formally correct answer--letter by letter from the booklet "Combat Team Member"--the sailor learned by heart information essentially useless to him. And information really necessary to him he acquired independently over a protracted period.

The successes as well as the errors in training a ship's ASW (combat) team depend primarily on the position of the commander and his understanding of this group's special role in the ship's organism. In connection with this, I would like to recall the experience of Capt 2d Rank N. Udovichenko who commanded a nuclear missile submarine at the time these vessels were just beginning to come into the fleet.

Although the missilemen worked with great enthusiasm and effort, things did not go smoothly for all of them at first. But the underwater missile carrier, commanded by Captain 2d Rank Udovichenko, was not returning to base without a victory. The crew had earned a VMF [Navy] prize and the commander had been awarded the Order of Lenin.

We, at the time young submariners, naturally tried to find out where the secret of this crew's success lay. It turned out that Udovichenko, earlier than anyone, had evaluated the role of the ship's combat team. They had accurately determined on the submarine what combat post and command point

specialists should compose the team. When employing the weapons, the places at these posts and points were at first given to the victors in the competition for the right to participate in the firings. Each one valued this honor and tried to justify the trust with deeds. Communists set the example. The schedule and duties of the team members were adjusted to the smallest detail. A test on theory served as permission for the right to start training. Training was conducted on working models and on the equipment. It ended with a thorough critique.

The ship's combat team achieved a high level of teamwork in a relatively short time. Then not only sailors selected based on the results of the competitions but also all the other specialists scheduled for the command posts and combat posts could successfully operate as part of it.

Such a demanding and thoughtful approach to the training of a ship's combat or ASW team is peculiar to many of our best crews. For example, things are arranged well on the ASW cruiser "Leningrad" and the large ASW ship "Ochakov." The commanders of these vessels skilfully organize competition among the sailors, petty officers and warrant officers for the right to be part of the ship's ASW team. Its specialists are sure to visit study rooms before going to sea. During the cruise, the ship commanders use every opportunity to make the team's training strenuous and multi-theme. Each mile of the cruise is used with the maximum benefit.

The experience of the "Leningrad" and "Ochakov" is valuable because it demonstrates the effectiveness of a multi-theme approach in achieving teamwork among the ship's ASW team. It shows that success comes to commanders who do not limit themselves to training individual groups but strive to organize each training session about their coordination, approximating the training situation to a combat one.

Matters progress better where the contact of flagship specialists with ship commanders and officers is put right. Staff officers, who visit ships frequently, help to improve training methods and introduce progressive experience. The headquarters considers their opinion about the training of the ship's ASW team when summing up training and competition results. However, there still unfortunately exist cases where flagship specialists do not know which ship has the best team in the unit and where additional efforts are required to eliminate shortcomings.

Let us say that if the staff had made a timely analysis of the training of the team on the ship, about which we were talking at the beginning of the article, it would not have been necessary to see errors in its work at sea. For the sake of fairness it is necessary to say that correct conclusions were drawn on the ship from what had happened. In order to "pull in the slack" in the training of the ship's ASW team, it was not considered dishonorable to turn for help and advice to neighboring crews. They began to conduct classes and training sessions more thoughtfully. Competition on tasks and norms was made more active. During recent exercises the crew successfully coped with assigned tasks.

Now, at the height of summer training when tasks are solved primarily at sea on cruises, it is necessary to make maximum use of each day and each training minute to strengthen the training of the crew, primarily the ship's team which engages in the battle of the crew's combat nucleus against the enemy.

Improving Socialist Competition

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 77 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt V. Filatov, deputy commander for political affairs on the submarine "Ul'yanovskiy Komsomolets": "Not Only Miles Are Astern"]

[Text] Our sailors now have an especially good attitude. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's report to the May CC CPSU Plenum and the draft of the country's new constitution have evoked a great upsurge in the collective. The sailors have greeted with approval the election of L. I. Brezhnev as president of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. All this has inspired the people, awakened new initiative, and raised work efforts.

This is also observed during socialist competition. We are trying to develop the best that is in its organization. A recent cruise was especially instructive for us in this respect.

A week before going to sea, the senior political worker warned me to concentrate the special attention of communists and the Komsomol aktiv on competition and on raising its role in the training process and in indoctrination.

It can be demonstrated that competition on a long cruise is "switched on" at the moment a boat casts off from the pier. But no, it does not begin so suddenly. It ripens in good time and appropriate conditions are created for it just as for grain scattered in the ground. In other words, it is necessary to create the required attitude. Before the cruise, our party activists arranged a meeting between the crew and party and navy veterans. On the eve of the cruise, they invited the secretaries of Komsomol organizations from local enterprises. The latter talked about the struggle of city youth to fulfill the goals of the Tenth Five-Year Plan ahead of time and wished the sailors success.

Finally, there was a meeting on the Avenue of Hero Submariners....

In a word, a good attitude was created.

We are travelling under water--ever further and further from the shore.... The secretary of the party organization, Engr-Capt Lt A. Strakhov, and Wo [michman] V. Puzanov constantly watched that the "Competition Screen" depicted the progress of the rivalry so that the competing parties would know who was in front and who was lagging behind in what. Wall and radio newspapers soon appeared based on the first results.

It is not said without reason that competition is a living creative work. Every time it throws light on new problems. So it was now. Smm A. Balashevich, a radio specialist, approached me:

"Why do I keep on getting fours?"

"Are they too high?" I asked half-jokingly although I understood, of course, that he was dissatisfied.

When I began, as they say, to ascertain the truth, his commander declared: "I have no personal grudge against Balashevich."

It turned out that the lieutenant was lacking self-control and was creating a strained situation by his irritated tone. The men's nervousness then qualified as tactlessness. I advised him to be more composed and objective.

It seems to me that in following a moral line in competition it is necessary, first of all, to know how to be attentive and objective. If a fighting man reaches the thought that his endeavors are not being noticed, that no one is interested in the feelings he has toward his job, that results are summed up for the sake of appearances, that fives are given out like cake, and that threes are also turned out without ceremony, he loses interest in the competition.

No, we cannot overlook the moral and ethical aspect of competition.

This did not interest Balashevich's commander. It was not difficult to be convinced that the sailor felt keenly his lagging behind in the comradely competition with the others. He worked stubbornly and exerted a lot of effort in helping young specialists. He was touchingly concerned about them. He performed watch excellently. The trouble would not have been in the ~~four~~ if the lieutenant had correctly approached the evaluation process. He considered a four a low grade for it was extremely rare among the usual fives. It seemed that he rated Balashevich lower than the others.

The commander and I corrected this matter. We also told WO A. Stetsenko that that was not the way to sum up results. He limited himself to announcing the results of carrying out the norms but absolutely did not "touch upon" ethical and moral indices. He did not direct attention to them.

We learned from party and Komsomol information that such incidents were not isolated. It was decided to conduct a demonstration on summing up results. The submarine's commander, Capt 3d Rank A. Golovchenko, conducted it.

The art of combining the "numerical and qualitative" part of competition and the "moral" part into a single process does not come easy.

Sometimes we are told:

"I have no time to gather special information on 'emotional out bursts'."

Persistent objections can be raised against this. A man reveals many of his qualities during the training process. You, the commander, are at the center of all events, collisions, and "emotional outbursts." It is only necessary to pay attention to the men, their concrete results, and the motives for their actions. If you only see panels and handwheels, do not notice the men near them, and do not reflect on their work and emotional needs, you do not have a deep knowledge not only of the men but also of the whole affair.

The watch officer complained about the "dried" actions of Seaman Prokopenko, a mechanic. The officer explained: "He exerts no effort no matter how much you criticize him" However, he is mistaken. Being very conscientious and honest, the sailor keenly felt the failures and reproofs. He became flustered even more because of this and lost faith in himself. Our party secretary, A. Strakhov, understood his emotional needs and saw him in a new light. The individual cheered up and returned from the cruise with the title of best mechanic.

It was not in vain that the commander and party activists "touched up" the course of the competition so persistently. The topical classes, about which I have already spoken, helped very much. It's as if a second sight came to light and nothing escaped. One rushed to help a comrade from a difficult situation--they noticed; one voluntarily undertook a difficult task which had arisen--they noticed; one kids offensively about the cook--it does not escape attention.... All this then entered into the rating indices and became a topic for praise or censure.

When PO 1st Class A. Sannikov and A. Teterich and PO 2d Class S. Birki and V. Stekachev were honored as champions, their political, moral and spiritual qualities were mentioned. They had become the kinds of people whom their comrades saw in a new way. They saw and envied them in a good way. They wished to improve themselves and be equal to them.

The boat was returning from the cruise. Astern were not only miles but also hard work and our experiences. Not only ratings but also new experience had come to us.

Now, inspired by the decisions of the May CC CPSU Plenum and by the great event, which the general discussion of the draft constitution for the USSR is, we will improve our ability to organize competition in order to achieve high results in honor of the October revolution jubilee.

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CSO: 1801

TACTICAL TRAINING OF JUNIOR GROUND FORCES OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jun 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Kavunenko: "Initiative in Battle -- Development of the Commander"]

[Text] A well-fortified strongpoint turned up on the tank battalion's route deep within the enemy defense. It seemed that the best way to maintain a high rate of advance would be to go around it. The battalion's primary mission was to seize a mountain pass. Capt N. Ban'ko, commander of the company operating on the left flank, proposed this plan. Maj V. Shachinov, the battalion commander, could not agree, however. The thing was that at this same time the battle reconnaissance patrol had detected a column of tanks coming out of the barchan dunes on the right. The battalion commander understood that the situation had become much more complicated. He decided on a plan but did not pass it on to his subordinates yet. He was waiting to hear the plan of Sr Lt V. Komarov, whose company was advancing on the right flank. Waiting in this way showed great trust for the young officer; after all, every minute was precious.

Then he heard the slightly agitated voice of Komarov in the telephone unit of his tank helmet: "I have decided to advance to the line ... repulse the tank counterattack from there. May I have fire support..." This was just the decision Major Shachinov was waiting for. He specified a few details only and then sent out his battle order by circular radio.

Concealing itself behind the dunes, the third company made a swift maneuver and came out in the flank of the counterattacking enemy. The outcome of the training battle was foreordained.

At the first opportunity Major Shachinov assembled the officers and analyzed the actions of each in this stage of the exercise. He praised Captain Ban'ko for intelligent actions in attacking the strongpoint. In order to achieve surprise Captain Ban'ko had made the attack from the side with deep gullies. Two tanks had been unable to get through the natural obstacles. On the other hand, the rest had struck the enemy in the place where there were fewest antitank weapons. The company commander's risk had paid off.

At no time during the entire exercise did Major Shachinov over-direct the company commanders; he was striving to develop their self-reliance. When the plans adopted by the officers were not entirely appropriate to the situation he provided additional information on development of the situation and guided the tactical thinking of his subordinates into the necessary channels in order to help them become aware of their mistakes and correct them themselves.

That is how it should be at an exercise, it would seem. But one often encounters cases where the senior officer allots most of the time at an exercise to himself. His subordinate commanders occasionally have time enough for nothing more than grasping the general outline of his plan and repeating his commands. There is simply no room left for them to develop self-reliance. The trainees form the impression that the heightened pace of battle leaves lower-level commanders no time at all for independent decisions. But in reality things will be quite different.

It is sometimes said that the primary place to develop the initiative and self-reliance of new officers is during training periods in the command training system, but at exercises the training leader, whether he likes it or not, must adapt them to actions that fit his conception.

In the regiment where Major Shachinov serves short tactical exercises, group exercises, and radio drills for officers are conducted on a sufficiently high level. At the same time, the regiment also values those especially favorable opportunities which arise at tactical exercises. Unfortunately, this is not the case in all places.

I recall a talk with Sr Lt V. Zhirnov, commander of a motorized rifle battalion in the neighboring unit. He complained that new officers did not show initiative, that they worked with one eye on their superior and expected complete, finished plans. Not long after this talk I attended a company exercise being directed by Zhirnov. Senior Lieutenant Zhirnov discouraged initiative by the company commander and stubbornly guided the company to the place where it was supposed to meet the enemy. Finally, the subunit had only one variant of action remaining -- a penetration attack. No creative efforts were demanded of company commander Sr Lt N. Artyukhin at this exercise.

While he wanted his subordinate officers to show initiative and be ready to make important plans independently, the battalion commander did very little to develop these qualities in them at this exercise.

But why did Senior Lieutenant Zhirnov, who himself recently commanded a company, over-direct his subordinate officers? I think this is a result of violation of one of the leading principles of military pedagogy: the superior teaches his subordinates. The regimental commander conducts most of the training periods with company commanders. The battalion commanders conduct short tactical exercises and group exercises with platoon-level officers. As we see, this shift is not proving useful.

Of course, it is permitted for the regimental commander personally to conduct training periods with company and battery commanders. What is important here is that he not forget the primary mission: to teach the battalion commanders so that the level of professional competence of each officer is the concern, first of all, of his immediate superior.

The more we hear the demand "Your decision, comrade lieutenant?" in training periods in the command training system and at tactical exercises, the more knowledge, resourcefulness, and initiative this decision will show and the faster and better the development of new officers will proceed.

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TANK BATTALION STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF GUARD DUTY

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jun 77 p 2

[Article by Guards Sr Lt A. Kil'gyankin, chief of staff, tank battalion, Central Group of Forces: "A Mission of Special Importance -- Vigilance Is Our Weapon"]

[Text] I often have occasion in the line of duty to check over the records for guard duty. And it is always satisfying to read an inspector's note to the effect that the guards were vigilant and followed regulation requirements strictly. After all, such entries reflect not only successful accomplishment of a specific combat mission but also the level of diligence and responsibility of personnel in the subunit as a whole.

There have been no violations of guard service in our tank battalion for a long time. But we never forget that, no matter how smoothly and precisely organized guard work may be, our efforts in this crucial area cannot be relaxed. When a unit begins emphasizing its successes and even a trace of complacency appears, work to indoctrinate personnel in a spirit of high vigilance loses its cutting edge.

We are concerned first of all that personnel have a profound understanding of the significance of high political vigilance for successful performance of the missions facing our Armed Forces and that they know the regulations for guard duty well. Let me emphasize that this means all the regulations. During preparation of guards and checking their knowledge they are often asked the same questions over and over. This inclines the men to study only certain articles and narrows the level of their theoretical training. The officers of our battalion demand that subordinates know the regulations in full. This is plainly useful: regardless of their experience and years of service, soldiers and sergeants preparing for guard duty must go back to the regulations and check their knowledge over and over again.

Planned training periods for studying general military regulations are considered very important in the battalion. Demonstration training periods in the most complex subjects involved with understanding the regulations are conducted for platoon and crew commanders at training methods assemblies at the start of the training period. Officers, ensigns, and sergeants

are familiarized with the most beneficial training techniques and receive specific recommendations on how to work out an outline, involve the men in active discussion of a question, and give quizzes. New commanders value the advice of officers R. Mal'tsev and V. Karasev, who are experienced methodologists.

To insure highly effective planned training periods for study of the regulations, in particular the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations, we try to hold these periods at training sites equipped in strict accord with regulation requirements. And the training leader emphasizes this and teaches his subordinates to check their behavior, training, and everyday life against the regulations.

In our battalion the practical training periods for personnel going on guard duty are always held by company commanders. We follow this regulation requirement absolutely. Not only is the company commander better prepared than the other officers of the subunit in a methodological sense; when he personally conducts the training period it stresses the exceptional importance of the mission being given to the guard. But the educational effect of the training period, of course, depends above all on how well it is done.

The training periods led by Guards Lt A. Maksimov always prove to be interesting. He makes skillful use of the capabilities of the guard area. At each training site he gives the trainees unexpected missions that demand instantaneous assessment of the situation and intelligent actions of the chief of the guard, relief NCO's, and guards. During the training period he instructs the aktiv and gives specific assignments to agitators and the editors of operational news sheets. All these things have a beneficial effect on the performance of guard duty by subunit personnel.

Problems were once noted in the performance of guard duty by personnel of the company commanded by Guards Sr Lt B. Kozlov. He is an experienced, hard-working, and persistent officer who has often demonstrated his skills at tactical exercises and shown himself to be a man of great technical sophistication. It was difficult to explain the omissions noted in organization of work by the guards detailed from his subunit. It turned out that the company commander considered the preparation of personnel for guard duty to be a less difficult job than others and felt that it would be handled well in any case. He himself scarcely prepared for practical training periods at all; he conducted them extemporaneously and was not averse to turning over direction of them to other officers. His subordinates could not be unaware of this. It took the battalion command and party organization considerable effort to correct the situation.

Maj A. Kolesnik, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, staff workers, communists, and the Komsomol aktiv devote constant attention to propagandizing regulation requirements and the need for constant high vigilance. The battalion has special displays with pictures of those who have performed guard duty in an exemplary manner and demonstrated vigilance, at their post or in any other life situation.

Thematic evening meetings and discussions of films and books which reveal the significance of high vigilance are popular in the subunit. We set them up with help from cultural-educational workers from the unit club and garrison House of Officers as well as library activists.

Military installations, equipment and weapons, and other materiel, the things on which unit and subunit combat readiness depend, are tirelessly watched by guards at any minute of the night or day. And these guards have everything they need to perform their combat duty in an exemplary manner.

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CSO: 1801

REMOTE RADAR SITE DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 77 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Bedzhanyan: "Communists at a Remote Site"]

[Text] The company very quickly came to realize that Sr Lt V. Molodovskiy placed the greatest value on men with technical skills, able to find and eliminate trouble on their own and adjust the equipment with high precision. He himself worked hard to see that the subunit developed more specialists with these qualities.

Soon after his arrival at the radar site Molodovskiy dropped in on Lt Yuriy Ogon'kov on a Sunday. The lieutenant's bachelor apartment was a mess and the air was heavy with the smell of burned rosin. Yuriy himself, with soldering iron in hand, was deeply involved in working on a panel from an unfamiliar radio unit.

Seeing the large figure of the company commander in his doorway Ogon'kov put down the soldering iron and dashed over to make his bed, but Molodovskiy stopped him:

"You should have done that earlier. What are you working on?" and he took a glance at the diagram in the magazine standing open on the desk. "Aha, remote control by tape recorder. A pretty good idea. But there are more important things to do. The operators classroom, for example, has to be fixed up with up-to-date equipment. How about it, Ogon'kov, will you take care of it?"

Still not recovered from the commander's unexpected visit, Yuriy nodded his head silently.

"Well fine," Molodovskiy smiled broadly. "Tomorrow we can talk over what to do and how. Now you pick out some sharp assistants." Then, shaking Yuriy's hand firmly, the senior lieutenant left the room.

Ogon'kov was an "explosive" personality and known in the company as a man of action. In less than a month the operators classroom resembled a respectable academy lecture hall with moving diagrams and models of radar equipment.

"Good work, boys!" Senior Lieutenant Molodovskiy remarked with pleasure after a careful inspection of the room. At a formation of personnel he commended Lieutenant Ogon'kov, Sergeant A. Kushnir, Private V. Sidorin, and the other company craftsmen involved.

Within a few days after this Lieutenant Ogon'kov distinguished himself again, at an important drill this time. During the review the commander said many favorable things about him.

Indeed, Ogon'kov was growing before their eyes. His explosive, egotistical nature apparently had been just waiting for an opportunity to show off in the most difficult jobs. Sensing this, Senior Lieutenant Molodovskiy gave the young officer more and more difficult assignments. And he consulted with him more often when working out problems of operating and repairing the equipment and increasing efficiency.

The commander's attitude toward the young officer could not help forcing other specialists to work harder on technical training. When ratings tests came up many of them stood out for excellent skills. After the ratings commission had totaled the results of their work the men went away happy and satisfied. Except for Lieutenant Teterin, deputy company commander for political affairs, whose severe, concerned expression did not change. Senior Lieutenant Molodovskiy noticed this and asked him:

"Aren't you pleased, Vasiliy Nikolayevich? Look, half the company is now specialists first and second class."

"I am pleased about that, but something else bothers me," Teterin replied. "I am bothered by Lieutenant Ogon'kov's behavior. He is rude. He acts arrogant. It seems he now considers himself an irreplaceable specialist."

"Oh, it won't take long to straighten that out," Molodovskiy sighed in relief. Then, glancing at his watch, he set off in a hurry. "The unit is going to telephone me. I'll be at the position."

A radar site is a unique place. Far from large garrisons, noisy crowds, and the turbulent life of the city it is easy to simply wake up one fine morning in a foul mood and begin falling apart. To go unshaven, for example, or to dress improperly. And then, having released the internal brakes, to tumble on down. At a remote radar site the slightest concessions by the commander are extremely dangerous.

Did Senior Lieutenant Molodovskiy understand this? He probably understood it with his mind. But in practice he became completely wrapped up in combat training and visited the barracks less and less and lost interest in the other concerns of his subordinates. Questions of moral education were increasingly assigned to others. Sooner or later this had to show, and the first to sense the barely perceptible signs of the storm was political worker Lieutenant Vasiliy Teterin.

He met Ogon'kov once near the messhall, improperly dressed.

"Where are you going looking like that?" Teterin asked.

"What do you mean, where? That was dinner call. Anyway, is it really against the rules?" Ogon'kov inquired mockingly.

"Don't get smart!" Teterin frowned. "You'd better think about the kind of example you're setting for the soldiers. Will you please fix your uniform?"

"Well, I like that!" Ogon'kov snorted and started to step past Teterin. But when he confronted Teterin's firm look he just muttered something unpleasant, turned sharply, and marched off.

Teterin did not say anything unnecessary or insulting, but from that time forward a crack developed in his friendly relations with Ogon'kov. The political worker tried to have a straight talk with Ogon'kov and show him that by his behavior he was doing a disservice to the company commander and to educational work, but Ogon'kov just remarked with an ironic tone: "There seem to be too many bosses in the company." He rejected the talk, chilling Teterin's good intentions and leaving him with hurt and bitter feelings. Then, giving in to these feelings, as a kind of revenge against Ogon'kov but really mostly against the company commander who would not listen to him, Teterin decided: "I won't interfere."

Some time later the company first sergeant Ensign I. Isakov came to the political worker greatly upset:

"What is the meaning of this, comrade lieutenant? I gave Private Sidorin an extra detail for arguing with me, but Lieutenant Ogon'kov canceled the punishment and told me to keep my hands off his platoon..."

The first sergeant was respected at the site, for his firm, fair personality and responsiveness. As he had been the previous year, Isakov was head of the party organization. Teterin suddenly thought: he would be just the one to tell about everything that was festering inside him, that alarmed him, the company political worker. But to his own surprise, out loud he said to Isakov with irritation:

"Really, why are you telling me about this? Report it to the company commander!" and he busied himself with his own affairs as if he did not see the puzzled look of the first sergeant.

Unfortunately, for some time Lieutenant Teterin was unable to rise above his wounded dignity, to ignore his personal hurts in the interests of the collective. But soon events took place which made it impossible for him, as the company political worker, to stand aside.

Returning from the barracks after midnight, he noticed Yuriy Ogon'kov walking along unsteadily, returning from the nearby community. In the

morning Ogon'kov was late to work, arriving when the operators were already beginning regular work. The lieutenant sat down on a wooden box near the set. His round, high-cheekboned face was gray and lined. His red hair tumbled down over his face.

"You don't look like you're in a working mood," the company commander said as he passed by.

He said it calmly, as if nothing were wrong. This enraged Teterin, who was standing right there. In an instant he caught up with the commander.

"How can you help seeing that Ogon'kov has only come to work to catch up on his sleep? And this isn't the first time either!" Teterin said in a voice breaking with emotion.

"Well, in your opinion I'm too soft, maybe? I ought to be strict and throw out reprimands right and left? Is that what you mean?" Molodovski asked in a restrained tone, looking down at the short, stoop-shouldered Teterin.

"Sometimes strictness is necessary. For the common good," Teterin said.

"Well how I do things is not your concern," the company commander remarked drily. Then he turned and walked off to the other set.

For a minute Teterin stood as if struck dumb. When he raised his head he saw a triumphant smirk on Ogon'kov's face.

Several more days passed. To Teterin they seemed long, dreary, filled with hapless, tormenting reflections.

"I hardly recognize you, Vasiliy Nikolayevich. You're always so cheerful. But not today. Is there some trouble?" Senior Lieutenant Viktor Vedyanin, commander of the best radar team in the company, said to him on one of these days.

"Oh no," Teterin replied with a frown, "everything is fine."

Vedyanin was his superior in rank and Teterin felt less desire to open up to him than he had with Ensign Isakov. "There is no reason to show off my weakness," he thought. But at the next moment he wavered in his thinking.

"So everything is fine," Vedyanin smiled thinly. "But to me it seems as if something is going wrong in our company. All the commander appears to want from the men is a high rating. Ogon'kov has let relations in his platoon get familiar and informal. So now I look like a hard-nose compared to good old Ogon'kov, just because I demand that my subordinates follow the regulations... What do you think, is that a normal situation?" the senior lieutenant asked with concern in his voice.

Teterin listened to him and for the umpteenth time thought to himself that he was making an unforgivable mistake by trying to find a solution by himself, by reducing the whole affair to little more than personal relations. It was a matter of the authority of the company commander, the honor of the entire collective. Which was supposed to be his, the political worker's, concern. And not his alone. The communists were with him. The men who, at personal sacrifice, were performing difficult, very important work at this remote, border site. How could he imagine that the good name of the company would be less precious to them than to him, Lieutenant Teterin? Why was he avoiding a frank, party talk?

Looking straight in Vedyanin's eyes he suddenly said aloud: "You're right, Viktor Ivanovich, the time has come to talk about the state of moral educational work in a party meeting. What do you think?"

There were not many communists at the site. Ensign Isakov looked at each of them who was in the company office.

Senior Lieutenant Molodovskiy, his heavy head with the prominent forehead leaning forward, looked through the notes he had prepared for his report. He looked older than his 26 years; he seemed worried and tired.

One of the radar units had started acting up the previous day. It was after midnight before the trouble was found and the equipment adjusted. Molodovskiy had only a couple of hours of sleep. But in the morning, fresh-shaven and alert, he had instructed the shift going on combat duty. Then came training periods. At noon he had run home for dinner, played with his son a bit, then sat down with his report. A commander's time flies by...

Next to Molodovskiy was Senior Lieutenant Vedyanin, calm and controlled. Also there was Lieutenant Ogon'kov, his cheerful, carefree eyes impatiently glancing around the room. Vasilii Teterin had seated himself at the very end of the table. His fingers fidgeted with the pages of his notebook, but his face preserved its unemotional expression.

Finally the door creaked and Jr Sgt Zh. Kasumov, who had recently been admitted as a candidate for party membership, appeared on the threshold.

"Sorry," he said in embarrassment, "I was working on an assignment." He stood uncertainly in the doorway.

"We know, we know, Kasumov," Ensign Isakov said. "Sit down. All right, all our communists are here."

Ensign Isakov stayed after the meeting, having decided to see that things did not get postponed. He intended to copy the minutes over neatly.

"Kasumov did well for himself. He is right that we have neglected work with the sergeants," Ensign Isakov said, glancing sideways at the company commander who was still sitting at the table, but even more gloomy now.

"It was a good, frank talk. I think that Lieutenant Ogon'kov will be changing his behavior now. If, that is..."

"There can't be any 'if's'," Molodovskiy said harshly, suddenly lifting his head.

He rose, paced lightly around the room, then came right up to Isakov and concluded: "Comrade secretary, we are going to carry out the decision of the party meeting!"

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CSO: 1801

DIFFICULTIES IN METHODS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM DISCUSSED

Editors Solicit Response

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 77 p 2

[Editorial introduction: "How To Pass the Rapids -- Letters About the Work and Concerns of Efficiency Workers"]

[Text] The article "Streams and Rapids" published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 1 March of this year has brought an enormous reader response. In their letters to the editors our readers offer concrete suggestions and state their interest in further vitalization of the technical creativity of the fighting men. The editors are publishing a few of these letters today and hope that those who are responsible for this work in the army and navy will express their opinions on the issues raised by our readers.

Invention, Efficiency Work in Pacific Fleet

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 77 p 2

[Comment by Col (Res) L. Glukh, chief of the invention bureau of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, Honored Efficiency Worker of the RSFSR: "Provide the Material Base for Creative Work by Innovators"]

[Text] The efficiency worker movement in the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet broadens with every year. Work with innovators is particularly well organized in the units where the commissions on invention work are headed by Yu. Kalinogorskiy and P. Kvitko. Other names could also be mentioned.

A typical feature of technical creativity in our day is the broad scale and complexity of the developments proposed. These projects are not always within the capabilities of a single person, so collective creative work is becoming paramount. More than 70 percent of the proposals submitted are the result of collective labor. These proposals aim at raising the quality of combat training, building effective technical training aids, and making fuller use of the capabilities of the combat equipment and weapons.

Young navy innovators were widely represented at NTM-76 and the fleet was awarded a second prize for active participation in the second stage of the competitive inspection for introduction of technical innovations exhibited at the Exhibition of the Achievements of the USSR National Economy. Twelve of our efficiency workers received monetary prizes; three were given the badge "Outstanding Invention and Efficiency Worker"; eleven were awarded diplomas and badges as NTM laureates; many fighting men received certificates of participation in the Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy; three of our innovators were given the honorary title Honored Efficiency Worker of the RSFSR.

These successes did not come all by themselves. The command and party organizations gave a great deal of help to innovators. Socialist competition has a large role in the development of efficiency work. Each year the fleet commander in his orders totals the results of this work, determines the winners, gives prizes and monetary awards to the best efficiency workers, and awards challenge banners and pennants to the winners in socialist competition.

In our fleet a great deal of attention is devoted to propagandizing efficiency and invention work and publicizing the best innovators and their creative work. The fleet House of Officers operates a consultation office for efficiency and invention work where one can receive advice and answers to all kinds of questions, including legal ones.

But there are also substantial weaknesses in the organization of technical creativity. Efficiency and invention work is still at a low level in some units, even though there are more than enough objects to which creative thought could be applied. And also the ratio of introduction of proposals is high for the fleet overall, some technical developments whose use promises the greatest benefits are in the introductory stage for many months.

We will not try to attribute everything to one cause, but the authors of the article "Streams and Rapids" are absolutely correct to note that it is impossible to create new things using only improvised materials. Providing units and ships with the parts, assemblies, instruments, and other materials needed for practical introduction of innovative ideas is a problem we are becoming very aware of. Efficiency and invention workers sometimes have to spend more energy searching for necessary materials than they spend developing the technical innovations. It is obvious that the time has come to put the questions of material supply to units and ships on a planned basis. Supply agencies must take care of the material base for broad introduction of innovations.

Moreover, work on publication of technical information related to the most valuable efficiency proposals could be more intensive. In the article "Streams and Rapids" the idea was expressed that it would be wise to publish informational material on a fleet scale. We support this idea. It would be very useful to set up centralized publication of the papers of efficiency workers for proposals of general interest to the whole Armed Forces.

Useful Ideas Must Be Disseminated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 77 p 2

[Comment by Maj Ye. Gorbunov: "Why Is It So?"]

[Text] A special stand to test aircraft equipment was built in one of the units. Capt Tech Serv N. Korol'kov designed it. The innovation is significant and makes it possible to cut the time required for regular servicing almost in half.

Korol'kov's fellow servicemen, Capt Tech Serv V. Alekseyev, Ensign M. Akimov, Pvt N. Poddubenko, and others, have shown themselves to be active efficiency workers. The innovations developed and introduced by them are proving very helpful to specialists of the aviation engineering service. But the trouble is that people in other units sometimes know nothing of these useful devices.

Invention Commissions Have Important Role

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 77 p 2

[Comment by Maj-Engr (Res) I. Alimov: "A Great Deal Depends on the Commission"]

[Text] I was interested to read the article "Streams and Rapids." As a person involved in invention and efficiency work, I cannot help sharing the authors' pleasure at the successes of our army and navy innovators or the bitterness which they must sometimes experience.

It does hurt, of course, when the creation you have nurtured and suffered over is not used by the troops for a long time. It hurts even more, perhaps, when your proposal has been recognized elsewhere. I will not go into the details of the improvement which has already been introduced and is proving beneficial at more than 100 enterprises of various departments while it is still on paper within the military.

The point here is something else. Many years of practice confirm that the success of work depends in large part on the competence, energy, and, I would say, militance of the invention commissions found in every unit. Who belongs to these commissions? How familiar are these people with the problems of technical creativity? How well trained are they in legal and other issues? How do they use the aktiv and how do they organize their work? These matters are sometimes not fully considered in determining the composition of the commissions and summarizing their work.

But a formalistic approach to including particular individuals in the commissions often results in a situation where the commission seems to exist yet only a very small part of the enormous reserves of technical creativity are put to use.

Invention and efficiency work are not a goal in themselves. This work is evaluated not just by the number of inventions and efficiency proposals but also by the everyday benefits which the searching of innovators produces. Better servicing of the equipment, savings of materials, conserved equipment life, gasoline, kilowatt-hours of electricity, and a high level of readiness in combat equipment -- these are the main things to consider in evaluating the work of a particular commission. Of course, the creative atmosphere that reigns in the collective should be considered too. Are the men competing for "numbers on the report," or is the basic criterion the efficiency of their work, the concrete output?

"Active advocate of new things" -- these are good words in reference to efficiency and invention workers. But if these new things are to be really necessary, important, and essential greater attention must be given to each proposal and technical innovation. Collective discussions, exchange of know-how, and thematic seminars can be a good basis for the organization of all invention work.

Introduction Is the Main Thing

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 77 p 2

[Comment by K. Gunchenko: "The Main Thing Is Introduction"]

[Text] I read the article "Streams and Rapids." It correctly formulated a number of problems concerning efficiency work in the army and navy. But the list of such problems could be expanded. Just for example, take the question of introducing efficiency proposals. Things are not all right with introduction in all places. For example, the following happened to me. I worked out a design for a special water faucet for a multiperson soldiers wash basin and made a model of it. It was tested at one of the plants. The innovation received a positive assessment and the main power engineer at the plant confirmed this with written findings. The unit in which I work as a sanitation engineer, however, refused to introduce my invention. They said the faucet looks bad. In reality, I believe, that is not the point. They simply do not want to assume responsibility, to pass through the rapids of red tape.

Great significance is attached to the introduction of inventions and efficiency proposals in our country. It is no accident that technical creative work is given a special article in the draft of the new Constitution.

11,176
CSO: 1801

COOPERATION OF NAVAL COMBAT ARMS BASED ON WARTIME EXPERIENCE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 77 signed to press
24 Jun 77 pp 10-18

[Article by Flt Adm N. Smirnov, First Deputy Commander of the Navy: "From the Experience in Cooperation of Naval Combat Arms in the Course of the War"]

[Excerpts] In the pre-war years cooperation of the naval combat arms was considered to be an important factor of successful combat activity. The Temporary Combat Regulations for the Naval Forces of the RKKA [People's and Peasants' Red Army] noted that the "success of each combat operation at sea is attained by the /operational and tactical cooperation of the basic naval combat arms/"¹ [in bold-face]. In the Temporary Manual on the Conduct of Naval Operations of 1940 special significance was attached to cooperation with submarines, and it was stressed that they and aviation "are able to provide a profound sweep to the operation and ensure penetration into the depth of the hostile dispositions."² Questions of cooperation were also thoroughly presented in the manuals on the combat activity of the naval combat arms.

Proper attention was devoted to cooperation not only in theory and in documents, but also in practice. It was worked out in the course of combat training. Thus, for the year 1938 the People's Commissariat for the Navy assigned as the primary mission the working out of the naval battle and operation "based on the close cooperation of the surface and submarine fleet with aviation." Similar missions were also assigned in subsequent years. Cooperation between surface ships and submarines and aviation were worked out on exercises of the Black Sea Fleet in April 1939 and in the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in November 1940. During these same years, the Northern Fleet practiced the cooperation of aviation with torpedo boats and small submarine chasers. Problems in organizing cooperation were discussed in 1940 at a conference of command personnel of the Navy and the professor-instructor personnel of the Naval Academy as well as at assemblies of fleet commanders.

The correctness of our theoretical views on cooperation problems was confirmed in the course of the Great Patriotic War. It was improved with the accumulation

of combat experience, a growth in skill, and the arrival of new types of weapons and technical means. If individual examples of well-organized cooperation of various naval forces occurred in battles and operations in the first period of the war, then in the second and especially in the third periods it became a necessary condition for the success of actions. We will examine below problems in cooperation of naval forces during the landing of amphibious forces, in the disruption of enemy communications, and in the defense of naval bases.

The cooperation of various naval forces can be traced most completely using as an example the Kerchensko-Feodosiya amphibious operation (25 December 1941-2 January 1942). It was envisaged by its plan and was also controlled by operational directives and planning tables. Cooperation was organized by the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabr'skiy.

The cooperation of various forces in the Kerchensko-Feodosiya amphibious operation, in which the Black Sea Fleet supported the landing with an overall strength of about 42,000 men, had decisive significance for the attainment of success. The experience of the operation was thoroughly analyzed and generalized in a special directive of the People's Commissar for the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, which was dispatched on 18 July 1942 for the guidance of the fleet military councils.⁵ It noted such positive aspects as the cooperation of the landing forces with aviation and submarines and the broad involvement of combat ships for landing the first assault waves. Instructions for improvement of the cooperation of surface ships, submarines, and coast artillery with strike aviation and spotter aircraft were also issued by the People's Commissar for the Navy at a conference of command personnel of the fleets in November 1942.⁶

The experience of cooperation of various forces which was accumulated by the fleets in the landing of amphibious forces in 1941-1943 made it possible to lift its organization to a new stage in the third period of the war. Instructive in this regard are the assault forces landed by the Northern Fleet (commander Admiral A. G. Golovko) in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation (October 1944).

It should be noted that cooperation in the amphibious landing forces was usually accomplished under difficult conditions. Prior to the operation, their forces were often separated not only organizationally, but also territorially. Extremely compressed times were allotted for preparations. Embarkation of the troops on transports and ships was accomplished at different ports and bases which were at considerable distances from each other (in the Kerchensko-Feodosiya operation the embarkation extended for 350 kilometers). The crossing of the sea was accomplished by small detachments; the ships had to employ false maneuvers and land the force on a broad front (up to 250 kilometers) and prepare and execute assault landings on secondary directions in order to divert enemy forces from the main direction. Radio traffic was sharply restricted or stopped completely and sometimes no preliminary gunnery or air preparation for the landing was conducted. All this created additional difficulties for the organization of cooperation, but they were overcome.

Cooperation of various forces in amphibious assaults was attained on the basis of subordination or support. In the former case, the large units or units

allocated for the conduct of the operation were completely under the command of the operation commander while in the latter case, being subordinate to their own commander, they accomplished the missions assigned by the commander of the supported large unit. A planning table for cooperation controlled the actions of varied forces by objectives, place, and time. Organizational measures were supplemented by flexible, continuous, and reliable control which was based on well organized intelligence and information "from higher to lower" and "from lower to higher." Communication had exceptional significance here. "No communication--no cooperation"--this thesis was stressed repeatedly in the documents of the Main Naval Staff.

The mission for combat on sea communications required the thorough working out of cooperation between aviation, submarines, and surface ships.

Cooperation between submarines and aviation in the first period of the war was expressed primarily in the use of aerial reconnaissance data.

An important step on the path toward increasing the effectiveness of cooperation between submarines and aviation during strikes against communication lines became the working out of direct guidance of submarines by airplanes in the fleets. The methods for the accomplishment of this task were reflected in the appropriate manuals which were worked out in the fleets and then in the Manual on Combat Activity of Submarines which went into effect by order of the People's Commissar for the Navy on 21 November 1942. It was noted in the manual that the "guidance by aircraft acquires special significance in operations in distant areas and when the depth of the enemy's cruising formation and correlation of forces do not permit observing the attack objectives from the ships." Discovering the enemy, the flight commander was to transmit to the submarines with maximum accuracy the course and speed of the attack objectives and the time of observation. To close with the enemy the submarines, if the situation permitted, could travel in a surfaced position and the guidance aircraft, after the enemy had passed the submarines' positions, could return to the airfield after reporting the results of the attack to the command.

In the second and third periods of the war the effectiveness of cooperation between submarines and aviation in the fighting on lines of communications increased. This was furthered by the accumulation of combat experience, the improvement of weapons and technical means, and the numerical increase in the aircraft fleet.

Cooperation received considerable development in the defense of naval bases. One of the missions accomplished here was air defense [AD]. Prior to the war, the fleets' AD forces consisted of antiaircraft artillery regiments and separate antiaircraft battalions, batteries, and other subunits. While the ships were anchored in the bases, their antiaircraft weapons were included in the overall AD system. Direct supervision of the cooperation of the main base's AD forces was assigned to the fleet's AD chief who was subordinate to the fleet's commander of air forces. Such an organization contributed to the best use of fighter aviation for air defense.

In organizing cooperation between fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the base AD priority in the fleets was given to the fighters since it was considered that in their combat capabilities they have a considerable advantage over antiaircraft artillery. The airplanes were granted the initiative in the selection of the target and the moment for the attack. The signal, "I am attacking," transmitted from the fighter to the command posts of the antiaircraft artillery units which directed the cooperation served as a warning for the antiaircraft artillery that it should cease firing on the target selected by the fliers. Furthermore, antiaircraft artillery was assigned the mission of target indication. During the day, this was accomplished by shell bursts, and at night --by searchlight illumination.

Cooperation of naval forces was accomplished in the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol', Khanko, Novorossiysk, and a number of other bases and big maritime cities in which defense areas were created which were headed, as a rule, by naval commanders. For example, in Odessa all ground and naval forces were subordinate to Rear Admiral G. V. Zhukov, in Sevastopol' --to Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabr'skiy, and in Novosibirsk--to the commander of the 47th Army (in turn Major General G. P. Kotov, Major General A. A. Grechko, and Lieutenant General F. V. Kamkov; during the entire period of functioning of the Novorossiysk defense area Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov remained its deputy commander for naval matters.

The creation of defense areas had a positive effect on the stability and duration of the defense of the bases and ensured the close cooperation of all services of the Armed Forces and the naval combat arms.

As a rule, the defense areas became "strong points" and centers of resistance of ground forces on maritime directions. Cooperation with the ground forces was raised to a new stage thanks to the more complete involvement of surface ships of various classes in fire support: battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and subsequently boats armed with rocket launchers. Coast artillery--from permanent batteries to large units of railroad artillery-- directed in essence almost all their firepower toward the fire support of the maritime fronts. The division of the lines of the defense areas was established primarily with consideration of the capabilities of naval gunnery.

Close cooperation of naval combat arms was accomplished in the period of evacuation of the naval bases. For example, during the evacuation of the Odessa defense area which was conducted in accordance with the decision of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command [HQ SHC] on 1-16 October 1941, squadron ships, coast artillery, and naval aviation launched coordinated strikes against enemy positions and his troop concentrations. On the sea crossing, the transports were convoyed by cruisers and destroyers. Trawlers and torpedo boats went out to meet them from Sevastopol'. In the area of Tenderovskaya Bar their passage was supported by coast artillery. During daylight the convoy, which included more than 80 transports, ships, and boats, and stretched for more than 50 kilometers, was covered by fighters. Bombers launched strikes against nearby enemy airfields (Kherson, Chaplinka). All this permitted the evacuation of more than 35,000 troops on the final day of the evacuation alone.¹⁸ The maritime army was transferred to the Crimea at full strength without losses at sea.

Clear cooperation of forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was also attained during the evacuation of the garrison at the Khanko Peninsula which was executed on the order of HQ SHC 26 October-2 December 1941.

Thus, the experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that cooperation was one of the decisive factors in the successful combat activity of the Navy. It was worked out especially clearly in the preparation and landing of amphibious assaults and in fighting on communication routes. In the defense of naval bases and maritime beachheads, the proper organization and maintenance of cooperation were furthered by the creation of defense areas in which all naval combat arms and forces operated under a single command. This permitted the most complete combination of the combat capabilities of the various services and combat arms.

The experience of the war shows that the cooperation of forces must be planned and worked out ahead of time and thoroughly and reinforced by all types of support, reliable means and a well thought out communication system, and a stable and flexible control system. Its greatest effectiveness was attained only with the satisfaction of these conditions.

The success of cooperation between the various combat arms in the war years was furthered by the creation of mobile headquarters and auxiliary control posts which were located in the immediate proximity of the areas of combat operations, which permitted implementing the constant monitoring of the accomplishment of missions, introducing the necessary corrections in time, and ensuring the coordination of actions for time, place, and target.

In fighting on communications, the greatest effectiveness of cooperation was attained in those cases where the guidance of submarines to convoys was accomplished by the headquarters of submarine large units on the basis of an analysis of aerial reconnaissance data on the movement of enemy ships and vessels.

The significance of the experience of cooperation which was amassed by the fleets during the war years is retained to a certain degree even in our time. Under contemporary conditions, when the possible spatial scope of operations has expanded considerably and the power of naval weapons and the combat capabilities of naval combat arms have increased, the requirements for its organization are increasing substantially and the forms and methods are becoming more varied. At the same time, the new capabilities of naval weapons and means of communication as well as of the means for illuminating the naval situation and the collection and processing of information have created new conditions and opportunities for the accomplishment of cooperation in a tactical, operational, and even strategic plane. In this regard, under certain conditions the problem of cooperation in a number of cases develops into a problem of centralized control of the actions of varied forces whose purpose is the accomplishment of a common operational or strategic mission. All this dictates the necessity for a deep study of the war's experience and its creative development.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Vremennyy Boyevoy ustav Morskikh Sil RKKA 1937 g" [Temporary Combat Regulations for the Naval Forces of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army 1937] (BU MS-37). Moscow-Leningrad, 1937, article 8.
2. "Vremennoye nastavleniye po vedeniyu morskikh operatsiy" [Temporary Manual on the Conduct of Naval Operations] NM0-40. Moscow-Leningrad 1940, article 30.
5. Section of the Central Naval Archives, fund 79, file 428, sheets 11, 17-22.
6. Ibid, fund 9, file 12327, sheets 373-375.
18. "Morskoy atlas, t. III, voyenno-istoricheskiy" [Naval Atlas, Vol III, Military History], Part 2, Published by the General Staff of the Navy, 1963, sheet 25-g.

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CSO: 1801

AIR FORCE SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES BASED ON WARTIME EXPERIENCE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 77 signed to press
24 Jun 77 pp 19-27

[Article by Col I. Timokhovich, professor, doctor of historical sciences:
"Air Force Cooperation With Ground Forces in a Front Offensive Operation"]

[Excerpts] Cooperation between the Air Force and Ground Forces in the years of the Great Patriotic War was accomplished on a strategic, operational, and tactical scale. The main efforts (more than 80 percent of the aircraft sorties) of Soviet aviation were concentrated for the accomplishment of missions in tactical cooperation with combined-arms (tank) large units. This article examines the improvement in the methods for its organization and execution in front offensive operations.¹

Front offensive operations did not receive wide application in the first period of the war. Nevertheless, the experience of cooperation between ground forces and aviation which was obtained when launching front counterblows in the summer of 1941, in the counteroffensive at Moscow, Tikhvin, and Rostov, in the offensive operations in the winter of 1941/42, and in the operation of the Southwestern Front on the Khar'kov direction in May 1942 had important significance. It was the basis for the further development of methods for the organization and conduct of joint combat operations by ground and air forces on the battlefield.

Combat practice has shown convincingly that it is impossible to ensure the high precision of air strikes against enemy objectives in the immediate proximity of friendly troops without a reliable system for control and target indication for the Air Force on the battlefield and clear organization of mutual designation.

Under conditions of the high dynamism of combat operations, the most reliable means of communication between aviation and the ground forces was radio. However, at that time there was an acute shortage of radio equipment. As a rule, on-board radios were installed only in the aircraft of unit and subunit commanders. The air representatives who travelled out to the ground forces were rarely provided with radios. Moreover, the radios which were available were not always used competently and their quality was poor.⁴ There was virtually no firm direction of aviation above the battlefield from the ground.

The panels, flares, colored smokes, and shell bursts which were employed at that time as means for guidance and target indication were not always easily noticeable from the air. Furthermore, at times the visual signals which were given by friendly troops with the approach of groups of airplanes were duplicated by the enemy on false sectors and directions. Therefore, the pilots found the objectives intended for attack with difficulty. Afraid of hitting friendly troops, they attacked the enemy at a great distance from the FEBA [forward edge of the battle area] (10-15 kilometers) outside fire coordination with the infantry, artillery, and tanks. Consequently, the rifle divisions could not exploit immediately the results of the actions by friendly bombers and attack aircraft. Air strikes did not have the proper effect on the course of the offensive battle (operation).

Radios were rarely used to control fighters from the ground and direct them to aerial targets. This reduced the effectiveness of employment of fighter aviation when repelling raids by enemy bombers.

"Without radio communication it is impossible to redirect airplanes in case of a changed situation and...there can be no talk of any close coordination between aviation and the ground troops.... Aviation does not know the targets and objectives of friendly troops and bombs and attacks areas and regions,"⁵ the air force commander of the Soviet Army noted in his order of 27 March 1942.

The poor organization of cooperation can also be explained by other reasons: a lack of experience and the inability of combined-arms and aviation commanders quickly to coordinate the efforts of their units on the battlefield; the location of aviation command posts at a considerable distance from the CP's [command post] of the ground troops and the absence of reliable and continuous communication between them; the great distance of control posts from the FEBA.⁶

As a result of this Air Force unit and large-unit commanders did not always receive specific combat missions in time and were poorly informed about changes in the ground situation in the area of combat operations. Combined-arms commanders did not have data on the sorties and combat capabilities of aviation and did not mark a clear front line.

The fragmentation of the forces of aviation among the combined-arms armies, as occurred in the first period of the war, had a negative effect on the organization and implementation of cooperation. The creation of army aviation, that is, the subordination of air regiments and divisions to the combined-arms armies, led to violation of the principle of massing the strength of the Air Force. As a result, Air Force units rendered weak assistance to the ground forces on the battlefield.

The Soviet command undertook energetic measures to eliminate the shortcomings which had been disclosed, especially at the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943.

The process of improving cooperation had a multifaceted character. It encompassed an entire complex of measures connected with the preparation and conduct of combat operations of the ground troops and aviation on the battlefield. First of

all, there was an increase in the quantity and an improvement in the quality of radio equipment in the Air Force units and large units. All combat airplanes began to be equipped with on-board radios. The number of ground radios also increased steadily. If the units and large units of front aviation received 124 ground radios from industry in 1942, in 1963 they received 698. On the whole, the number of radios in the system for the control of front aviation increased seven-fold. Beginning in 1963, the basic means for the control of aviation on the ground and in the air became radio communication.⁷

Air Force flight-controller officers were sent to the combat formations of the attacking troops. With the aid of commands and signals which they gave on a separate wavelength of the guidance radio net, the pilots quickly found and hit those objectives which served as an obstacle to the advance of the infantry and tanks. The strikes of bombers and attack aircraft here were brought as close as possible to the attacking troops (500-800 meters), were clearly coordinated with their actions by place, time, and missions, and had an immediate effect on the course of combat operations.

Marshal of Signal Troops I. T. Peresyphkin, in the book "Voyennaya Radiosvyaz" [Military Radio Communications] wrote: "It can be said with confidence...that the control of the Air Force troops and the close cooperation of the Air Force with the Ground Forces and the Navy with the aid of radio ensured our victory in the struggle with the fascist aggressors in all big offensive operations with considerably less blood.... Thanks to radio control our 'aerial tanks'--attack aircraft--were directed to the battlefield and struck enemy artillery, tanks, infantry, and command posts, increasing the fire efforts of the troops and artillery on the FEBA.... Thanks to radio control, our fighter aviation received the capability to cover ground troops reliably on the battlefield against the strikes of enemy aviation."⁸

Great significance was had by bringing aviation's control posts closer to the CP's of the ground forces and the personal contact between commanders of the cooperating large units. In the second and third periods of the war, the CP's of the air armies were deployed alongside the CP of the commander of the front or army which was operating on the direction of the main effort and they were located 25-40 kilometers from the FEBA. Beginning with the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, auxiliary control posts (VPU) began to be created in the air armies along with the main CP. They were located 8-15 kilometers from the FEBA on the direction of the main effort in the immediate proximity of the front commander's control post. The air army commanders or their deputies who were located at them received the capability to control the air large units in conformity with the situation which had developed.

An important role in the organization and maintenance of continuous cooperation was played by the operational groups which were detailed by the staffs of air armies to the combined-arms (tank) formations. Each group included 8-10 experienced officers and it was headed by a responsible officer. It had one or two ground-based radios to control aviation in the air and for communication with the headquarters and airfields of the supporting and covering aviation. Air

representatives were sent to the rifle corps from the air large units. The operational groups and air representatives not only informed their command about the ground and air situation in the area of combat operations and transmitted requests for air strikes, as was the case earlier, but they also coordinated questions of cooperation with the combined-arms command, organized the control and guidance of airplanes on the battlefield, and followed the accomplishment of combat missions by the air large units.

The CP's of commanders of fighter and attack-aircraft large units were located, as a rule, alongside the CP or OP [observation post] of the covered and supported combined-arms armies (rifle corps). Commanders of air corps and divisions could personally observe the air and ground situation, implement close liaison with the commander of the combined-arms formation (large unit) in whose interests the aviation was functioning, influence the course of combat operations by calling for additional air forces from the airfields or retargeting the aircraft in the air, personally check the accomplishment of the assigned missions, and direct guidance and target indication.

Great significance was had for the organization of close cooperation between the aviation and ground troops by single signals for mutual identification which were introduced for all the Armed Forces by the General Staff in August 1943 and by the "Instructions on Cooperation Between Aviation and the Ground Forces" (1943).¹⁰ The Instructions set forth the basic propositions for the procedure in coordinating the efforts of the troops and aviation on the battlefield and defined the tasks of the combined-arms and air commands and their staffs in the organization and maintenance of cooperation.

A positive role was also played by a single system for target designation. It consisted of the fact that the most important enemy objectives which had been disclosed on the battlefield were numbered and plotted on maps which were had by the combined-arms and air commanders located at the control posts and by commanders of groups of airplanes and air controllers.

In the offensive operations of the second and third periods of the war, great attention was devoted to the planning of the cooperation and conduct of preparatory measures on coordinating the efforts of the troops and aviation on the battlefield. The air force commander of the Soviet Army called attention to this very matter in a directive of 7 July 1943.¹¹

The continuous improvement of the organization and maintenance of cooperation between the troops and aviation proceeded in this manner.

In the second and third periods of the war the offensive was the main, predominant type of combat operation. As formerly, the main efforts of attack and daytime front bomber aviation were directed toward the destruction of enemy personnel and equipment on the battlefield and the immediate rear area. In the operations of 1943 91 percent of all aircraft sorties by attack and daytime bomber aviation were carried out for the accomplishment of missions in cooperation with the ground forces, and in 1944-45--75-85 percent.¹²

At the same time, fighter aviation concentrated its efforts to cover the attacking troops from enemy air strikes and to support the actions of its own attack aircraft and bombers. Great attention was devoted to tactical aerial reconnaissance and battlefield observation.

The experience of the war showed that with the conduct of dynamic, maneuver operations and with an increase in the number of mobile, small targets the organization and maintenance of cooperation between the troops and aviation on the battlefield grew steadily more complex.

The rapid coordination of the efforts by the troops and aviation by missions, time, and targets was unthinkable without a clearly organized system for control of aviation, target designation and mutual designation, a high level of operational efficiency in the work of staffs, good combined-arms training of air commanders, and firm knowledge of aviation's combat capabilities by combined-arms commanders.

Under contemporary conditions, despite the basic changes in the means for armed conflict success in an operation, just as formerly, will be attained by the efforts of all the forces and means which participate in it.

Much from the experience of organizing cooperation between the Air Force and the Ground Forces which was obtained in the war years has not lost its value under contemporary conditions. Namely: the detailed development of plans for cooperation and the joint preparation of the command and staffs of cooperating large units and formation on maps, mockups, and the terrain; bringing aviation control points closer to the CP's of the combined-arms commanders; organization of continuous communications between headquarters and control posts of cooperating large units; continuous exchange of information on the situation, one's operations, and contemplated plans; personal contact between commanders and of responsible air representatives with commanders of combined-arms large units and formations; the wide employment of radio means of communication in combination with visual signaling means in the system for control and target indication for aviation on the battlefield.

FOOTNOTES

1. Concerning cooperation between the Air Force and the Ground Forces on an operational-strategic scale see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 5, 1976, pp 30-38.
4. The following radios were employed in the first period of the war: on fighters--RSI-3 and RSI-4, on bombers--RSB-bis, ground radios--RAF-KD, RSB-F, and 5-AK.
5. TsAMO [Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense], fund 221, inventory 5691, file 1, sheet 82.
6. In operations of the first period of the war the CP's of air armies (air forces of fronts) were located 60-80 kilometers from the FEBA, CP's of

commanders of air large units--in the deployment areas of their units, that is, 40-80 kilometers from the front line (depending on the type of aviation).

7. In the second and third periods of the war the following were designed and entered the inventory: aircraft radios RSI-6 (on fighters and attack aircraft), modernized RSB-bis radios (on bombers), and ground-based radios RAD-KV-3, RSR-3S.
8. I. T. Peresypkin, "Voyennaya Radiosvyaz'," Voenizdat, 1962, p 167.
10. TsAMO, fund 3, inventory 514446, file 6, sheets 138-143.
11. Ibid, fund 35, inventory 11285, file 769, sheet 20.
12. Ibid, fund 35, inventory 73965, file 5, sheet 71.

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PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN PAST WAR

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[Article by Army Gen Ye. Mal'tsev: "Party-Political Work in Army Defensive Operations"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpts] The events of the Great Patriotic War are receding farther and farther from us from year to year. But even today, its results and most important lessons have tremendous theoretical and practical significance. The experience accumulated by the Soviet Armed Forces in the struggle with the German fascist and Japanese militarists is an inexhaustible source and firm foundation for the further development of our military science in general and the improvement of party-political work in the army and navy in particular. Therefore, it is necessary for the contemporary generation of commanders and political officers to study deeply and carefully select from the past everything which has not lost its value today and which can be utilized creatively in the process of the ideological, moral-political, and psychological training of the troop personnel.

The pages of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL have already illuminated the practice of party-political work in army /offensive/ operations in the years of the last war.¹ The goal of this article is to trace how its content changed and forms and methods were improved depending on the conditions and situation in army /defensive/ operations in the years 1941-1945.

As is known, the defensive operations of each period of the Great Patriotic War had their own distinguishing features and peculiarities. They made their imprint both on the content and on the organization and methods of party-political work among the troops.

Thus, in the first period when fascist Germany, having created a superiority in forces and means, treacherously attacked the Soviet Union, the defensive operations of our armies bore a compulsory character. An extremely limited time was allotted for the organization of the defense and the improvement of positions, and at times there was none at all. The troops were forced to wage battle and

hold back the enemy's onslaught, frequently on unimproved positions, while the echelons which came up entered battle from the march and not always at full strength, but by units. Communications were often absent between large units and headquarters for a long time. The conditions for party-political influence on the personnel developed in an extremely unsatisfactory manner. Such a situation was typical not only in the course of border engagements, but also at Smolensk and Vyaz'ma, on the fields near Moscow and Stalingrad, in the battle for the Caucasus, and on other directions.

The terrible military danger which hung over the country required a fundamental restructuring of all activity of the party-political apparatus in the Armed Forces. In this period, the main documents containing the program for the struggle with the German-fascist aggressors were: The Declaration of the Soviet Government of 22 June, the directive of the Central Committee VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of bolsheviks)] and the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] USSR, "To the party and Soviet organizations of the oblasts at the front," of 29 June, and the speech by J. V. Stalin over the radio on 3 July 1941. Guided by them, the People's Commissariat and Main Political Administration of the Red Army, in instructions to commanders, political organs, and party organizations on 20 July 1941 demanded the operational restructuring of their work and the attainment of a decisive improvement in increasing the combat effectiveness of each unit and each subunit as well as the attachment of great purposefulness and operational efficiency to party-political work so that each Soviet fighting man profoundly realizes that the fate of Soviet power is being decided on the fields of battle with the Hitlerite hordes. "Now as never before," it was stressed in this document, "the necessity is for a will for victory, ideological solidarity, iron discipline, organization, a merciless struggle against traitors and betrayers, against indifference and carelessness, against cowards, panic-mongers, and deserters, the greatest selflessness, readiness to make any sacrifices in the name of victory over the enemy, and the readiness of each Red Army Man, commander, and political worker to fight to the last drop of blood, not sparing his life, for each foot of Soviet soil."²

Considering the situation which had developed the Central Committee VKP(b), on 16 July 1941, adopted a decision concerning the introduction of the institution of military commissars in the Red Army and, four days later, on 20 July, in the Navy.

On 19 August 1941 the Central Committee VKP(b) adopted a decree, "On the procedure for accepting into the party Red Army Men and command personnel of the Red Army who have especially distinguished themselves in battles," and on 9 December 1941, "On the acceptance as members in the VKP(b) candidates who distinguished themselves in battles with the German aggressors." These documents had great significance for the further strengthening of army and navy organizations. The basis of the decisions of the Party Central Committee concerning the acceptance into its ranks of men who had distinguished themselves in battles was formed by V. I. Lenin's idea that the party trusts "a party member who has come to us at a difficult moment."³

The decree of the Komsomol Central Committee on the procedure for acceptance in the Komsomol in the units of the active Red Army was published on 25 December 1941. An entire series of other documents of the party and the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army on restructuring all party-political work in the army and navy were adopted in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. They were directed primarily toward seeing that the basic content of party-political work was completely subordinated to the accomplishment of the primary mission-- to stop the enemy, bleed him in defensive battles and engagements, and smash the fascist aggressors.

In satisfying these requirements the army political organs, under the direction of the military councils and political directorates of the fronts, were able to restructure their work among the troops as applicable to the situation in an exceptionally short time. First of all, the basic efforts were directed toward seeing that each armed defender of our homeland felt with all his heart how great was the danger which hung over the first socialist state in the world and aroused himself for the merciless struggle with the presumptuous enemy.

The basic content of party-political work in the defensive operations of all armies was: the effective informing of the personnel about the military-political situation and its explanation to them; the molding of lofty moral-political and psychological qualities; and the indoctrination of the men in a spirit of steadfastness and combat activity, discipline, vigilance, and the strict execution of the requirement not to withdraw without an order. In organizing defensive battle, it was necessary to inform the fighting men about the combat mission, mobilize the men for the creation of a system of fire in a short time, for accomplishment of engineering work and camouflage, and to inspire the personnel for the conduct of bold and decisive counterattacks and counterblows to destroy the enemy who had penetrated our defense. Attention was called to the strengthening and timely restoration of party and Komsomol organizations and ensuring the personal example of communists and Komsomols in the accomplishment of a combat mission. And this was steadily accomplished among the troops. Furthermore, political workers were concerned about the timely rewarding of the men who had distinguished themselves in battles and providing them everything necessary for battle, the evacuation of the wounded, and rendering first aid.

Military-political direction of the army was accomplished by the military council. It bore complete responsibility for all aspects of the combat life and activity of the troops and their moral-political state and combat effectiveness.

The political department of the army and the political organs of the large units were the direct organizers of party-political work with the personnel. In accordance with the decision of the front commander and the instructions of the front political directorate, they developed a work plan which outlined specific measures directed toward ensuring the successful preparation and conduct of the defensive operation.

As the experience of the war has shown, many political departments of armies prepared supplementary plans: for the period of regrouping of the troops; for the preparation and conduct of the counterblow; for the landing of the assault

force; for the training of reserve political personnel, party organizers, and Komsomol organizers of companies and battalions and their assignment among the units and subunits in the course of battle; and they prepared reference material on the political-moral state of friendly troops and the morale of enemy troops.

The first months of the war were especially difficult: the process of reequipping the army, improving control, and restructuring the work of the party-political apparatus under new conditions was under way; experience had only just begun to be accumulated; and in the majority of cases it was necessary to organize the defense under the blows of superior enemy forces and with a suddenly changing situation. All this required of commanders and political organs exceptional mobility, clarity, purposefulness, and the ability to react quickly to changes in the combat mission.

The question of training the troops to combat enemy tanks became especially acute in that period of the war. In this connection commanders, army political organs, communists, and Komsomols allotted a considerable place to the training of the personnel in procedures and methods for their destruction, a graphic demonstration of the combat capabilities and advantages of Soviet combat equipment and weapons, and propaganda on the experience of the destroyers of enemy machines who distinguished themselves in battles. On this basis, the Soviet fighting men were indoctrinated in confidence in the strength and power of their weapons and equipment, steadfastness, persistence, and other moral-combat qualities.

Demonstration firings against captured tanks were conducted for these purposes in almost all armies. For example, in August 1941 such firings were organized by the military council of the Western Front. In accordance with the results of the firings a special order was published on 24 August 1941, "On combating enemy tanks," as was an entire series of instructions and leaflets, in particular, "For the commander and gunner of the 45-mm gun on firing at tanks," "How to throw Molotov cocktails," "Methods for throwing grenades at tanks," and others.

On 7 November 1941 on Red Square in Moscow, speaking to the troops who had set off for the front from the parade, the Supreme Commander in Chief, J. V. Stalin, said: "Comrade Red Army and Navy Men, commanders and political workers, and partisan men and women! The entire world is looking upon you as a force which is capable of destroying the plundering hordes of German aggressors. The enslaved peoples of Europe who have fallen beneath the yoke of the German aggressors look upon you as their liberators. A great liberation mission has befallen your lot. Be worthy of this mission!... For the total destruction of the German aggressors!... Under the banner of Lenin--forward to victory!"⁶

In 1942, the main military events had shifted to the southeast part of our country. The deep breakthrough of the German-fascist troops on the Caucasus and Stalingrad directions sharply aggravated the strategic situation. On 28 July the People's Commissar for Defense, J. V. Stalin, appealed to the troops with order No 227. Its entire essence consisted of a brief appeal, "Not one step backward!" This became the main direction in the work of commanders, political

organs, and party and Komsomol organizations. The order was immediately brought to the attention of each fighting man with the aid of all means for mass information as well as the party-political apparatus of the troops.

The experience of the last war shows that the main thing in party-political work in the course of army defensive operations was: constant organizational and ideological activity of commanders and political organs directly in the units and subunits, their active and continuous political influence on the masses of the men, and personal example of bravery, steadfastness, and selflessness in battle.

Party-political work furthered the successful conduct of the Kursk Battle which was the decisive event in the summer-fall campaign of 1943. The strategic initiative was firmly consolidated by the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Thus, the experience of the biggest defensive operations of the Great Patriotic War which were discussed above shows convincingly that active and purposeful party-political work was the most important condition for the conduct of defensive operations. Its basic efforts were directed toward the effecting of constant political influence on the personnel and indoctrinating the men in a spirit of boundless devotion to the party, the people, and the Motherland, faithfulness to communist ideals and military duty, Soviet patriotism and class hatred for the enemy, high steadfastness and combat operational effectiveness, and a sense of personal responsibility for the fate of the Motherland.

An active participant in the Great Patriotic War, the General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, stresses: "The soul of the Soviet Armed Forces were the political workers. They carried the word of the party to our men and inspired them to the heroic and selfless struggle. From the junior political officer to the member of the military council, they were found where it was most difficult, strengthening in the fighting men the faith in the triumph of the righteous cause, and instilling in them bravery, will, and fearlessness."¹⁶

In the decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," it says: "In the long, most difficult war in the history of our Motherland, the Soviet people accomplished an exploit the equal of which mankind had never known. They managed not only to defend their freedom and independence, but they also made the decisive contribution to the cause of saving European and world civilization from destruction by the fascist barbarians."¹⁷

Commanders and political officers must study deeply and use creatively the valuable experience of party-political work which was accumulated in the years of the Great Patriotic War in the training and indoctrination of the men in the interests of a further raising of the troops' combat readiness and strengthening the defensive capability of the Motherland.

FOOTNOTES

1. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 12, 1976, pp 52-60.
2. Yu. P. Petrov, "Partiynoye stroitel'stvo v Sovetskiy Armii i Flote (1918-1961)" [Party Organizational Development in the Soviet Army and Navy (1918-1961)]. Voenizdat, 1964, p 353.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 39, p 361.
6. J. Stalin, "O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuz" [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1947, pp 39-40.
16. L. I. Brezhnev, "Velikaya pobeda sovetskogo naroda" [The Great Victory of the Soviet People,] Moscow, Politizdat, 1965, pp 19-20.
17. PRAVDA, 1 February 1977.

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